After they had departed, the submersible named Titan was reconstructed with a new hull that was not tested to industry standards nor certified by an independent third-party agency. Patrick Lahey, the CEO of submersible manufacturer Triton Submarines, emphasized the importance of certifying novel hulls for safety. He testified that it was possible and essential to certify such designs, comparing their rigorous development and certification processes for the world’s deepest diving submersible to the Titan‘s lack of certification.
OceanGate’s initial missions to the Titanic in 2021 encountered numerous issues, including the Titan‘s forward titanium dome detaching, alarming readings on the acoustic monitoring system, and a thruster failure at a depth of 3,500 meters. A Coast Guard evidence slide documented 70 equipment issues needing correction from that season’s dives. The situation improved in 2022, with 48 recorded issues, yet serious problems persisted, such as dead batteries extending a mission from about seven to 27 hours and the submersible sustaining damage during recovery.
During one 2022 dive, a loud bang and cracking noise were heard when the Titan surfaced. Antonella Wilby, an engineering contractor for OceanGate, considered reporting this to the board of directors but was cautioned by another employee about potential legal repercussions. Wilby expressed that she felt dismissed and highlighted the need for a safe environment where concerns could be raised without fear of retribution.
On the Titan‘s penultimate dive in 2023, contractor Tym Catterson admitted to neglecting a safety check, resulting in the submersible listing at a 45-degree angle for an hour, causing discomfort for those onboard.
Testimonies varied on the safety of the Titan‘s carbon fiber hull. While some experts, like Dyer and Nissen, believed in its potential and the sufficiency of computer modeling and acoustic warnings for its use, others including Lochridge, Catterson, and former HR director Bonnie Carl, were more skeptical, though they acknowledged their lack of engineering expertise. Future testimonies from Phil Brooks, more submersible engineers, and a carbon fiber expert from Boeing are expected to shed light on these concerns. Particularly, an engineer from the National Transportation Safety Board’s Materials Laboratory will discuss the physical cause of the Titan‘s wreckage and implosion.
Investigators noted that the Titan should have been inspected by the US Coast Guard before carrying passengers. Despite OceanGate reportedly notifying the Coast Guard about its operations, no clear reason was provided for the lack of inspection. Lochridge testified that he had communicated his safety concerns to OSHA, who claimed to have passed this information to the Coast Guard. An upcoming testimony from a US Coast Guard witness based in the Puget Sound area may provide further insights.
Rear Admiral John Lockwood, who joined OceanGate’s board in 2013, was not among the witnesses. His role, according to Lochridge and Carl, was to oversee and facilitate interactions with the Coast Guard.
In addition to Lockwood’s absence, key OceanGate employees, such as Wendy Rush, Scott Griffith, and Neil McCurdy, who played significant roles in business, regulatory, and operational decisions, were also not called to testify. The manufacturers of the hulls were similarly not summoned. The Coast Guard has not provided a reason for their absence, other than to deny that it is due to those witnesses asserting their Fifth Amendment rights.
